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THE SUPREME COURT CONFRONTS THE GHOSTS OF ENRON: ASSESSING THE PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CORPORATE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT 
 
William J. Donoher, Missouri State University 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court ended its 2010 term with a significant ruling on the appeal of former Enron CEO Jeffrey 
Skilling that sharply curtailed application of the “honest services” doctrine, which had figured prominently in Skilling’s 
conviction.   The Court held that the conceptual breadth of the term “honest services” and the apparent inconsistency of 
rulings applying the doctrine rendered it unconstitutionally vague unless confined to cases of bribery or kickbacks.  
Notably, Enron and other corporate fraud cases did not involve either form of corruption.   This article reviews the 
development of the honest services doctrine, discusses and analyzes the Skilling decision, and argues that future corporate 
fraud enforcement is likely to be hindered not only by the specifics of the Skilling decision but also by its underlying 
ethical philosophy.    
 
What kinds of unethical behavior are significant 
enough, or reprehensible enough, to rise to the level of 
criminality, and how do we define that conduct?  Broadly 
speaking, this was the question facing the courts in the wake 
of the Enron disaster and the subsequent prosecutions of the 
executives who masterminded one of the most spectacular 
frauds in corporate history.  Before we begin looking more 
closely at the specifics of the case brought before the United 
States Supreme Court during its 2009-10 term, let us 
consider the question posed here in light of the following 
hypothetical situations: 
 
• A public official steers public business to a certain 
contractor, who “refunds” a small percentage of the 
contract proceeds to the official. 
• An employer seeking anonymity in certain 
transactions directs one of its employees to hire an 
outside entity to act as its contracting 
representative.  The employee instead establishes a 
new business formed for that purpose, holding it 
out to the employer as an independent company 
with the requisite experience and skill to act on 
behalf of the employer. 
• In a series of communications occurring over an 
extended period of time, a job applicant discloses 
her employer’s trade secrets to the prospective 
employer. 
• An employee fails to disclose certain negative 
information that would adversely affect the 
company’s stock price and, thereby, the employee’s 
compensation. 
 
Few of us reviewing this list would have significant 
difficulty deciding that all of these hypotheticals involve 
behavior that is, at the very least, unethical if not criminally 
fraudulent.  And knowing or believing this, few of us would 
be likely to act accordingly, whether or not we also took the 
time to review relevant criminal statutes to determine 
whether their definitions of criminality fit the facts of our 
prospective behavior.  Indeed, our beliefs likely would lead 
us to avoid that behavior without reviewing the law first.  
Here, then, is the focal point of the dilemma of legal 
definition, and the question to which we will return at the 
end of this article: If the purpose of the law is to provide 
notice of criminality, but most of us inherently recognize the 
existence of circumstances that would, at best, be 
questionable or unethical, who will review the law first, and 
with what motive? 
Although most of us are, indeed, likely to avoid 
situations such as those described above, all of these 
hypotheticals represent actual cases prosecuted under what 
has come to be known as the honest services doctrine.  Thus, 
someone acted unethically or criminally in each of these 
cases, and all were convicted as a consequence.  The first 
scenario involves one of the most common forms of 
corruption, that of the public official who abuses his or her 
office for personal gain.    The last scenario generally 
describes the Enron fraud.  Notice that each involves a 
somewhat different contextual and factual background, but 
all invoke our common concern with unethical or criminal 
behavior.  And yet, under the Supreme Court’s review of 
Jeffrey Skilling’s conviction, only the first of these clearly 
would be covered by the honest services doctrine, which, as 
the Court held, can now only be applied to cases involving 
bribery or kickbacks.    
This article surveys the honest services doctrine, 
summarizes and evaluates the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Skilling’s appeal, and assesses its likely future impact.  With 
regard to the latter, the central argument advanced here is 
that, although alternative theories of liability or criminality 
might apply to any or all of the remaining scenarios 
described above and to similar future cases, the Court’s 
ruling effectively limits prosecutors’ latitude in pursuing and 
prosecuting fraud, and thereby limits the deterrent value of 
fraud enforcement.   Discussion begins below with a look at 
the origin and development of the honest services doctrine, 
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THE PAST: THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE 
HONEST SERVICES DOCTRINE 
 
What we have come to know as the honest services 
doctrine traces its lineage to the original U.S. mail fraud 
statute (18 U.S.C. 1341), which was enacted in 1872.  
Although honest services did not come into being 
immediately upon enactment of this statute, the doctrine has 
been developing for roughly a century and therefore should 
not be seen as a completely new and unwelcome addition to 
the law.  To understand this evolution, we need to return to 
the language of the statute and follow its interpretation by 
the courts.   
Today’s version of Section 1341, following several 
amendments over time, reads in pertinent part as follows: 
 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises,…places in 
any post office or authorized depository for mail 
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or 
causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever 
to be sent or delivered by any private or 
commercial interstate carrier,… shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both….  
 
Clarity and parsimony of expression obviously were not 
fully appreciated or valued by Congress, and in fact the 
ambiguities of the statute’s language long have been noted.  
What is a “scheme or artifice to defraud”?  Exactly what 
kinds of representations or actions are to be considered 
provable as “false or fraudulent pretenses”?  For that matter, 
what is meant by “property”?  Indeed, it is precisely 
questions such as these that brought the issue of the statute’s 
interpretation to the fore in Skilling’s appeal. 
For our purposes, it is important to focus on the first two 
clauses of the statute and the sequence of their adoption.  
The initial version of Section 1341 omitted the second clause 
covering those “obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”  
Thus, as originally enacted, the statute applied only to “any 
scheme or artifice to defraud”—leaving open the question of 
what constituted a “scheme” or “artifice.”  In 1909, the 
statute was amended to add the “false or fraudulent 
pretenses” clause.  The question of what kinds of activities 
actually were covered by the law remained undefined, and it 
is a fair question whether this amendment otherwise clarified 
or further confused the original meaning and intent. 
In reviewing the statute, courts began to interpret the 
separate clauses as applying to different kinds of acts.  
Statutory interpretation generally assumes that different 
parts of a statute have independent meaning unless they are 
stated as simply providing examples or clarification.  In the 
case of Section 1341, the two clauses in question were 
enacted at different times, suggesting that Congress had 
different things in mind even though both arguably could be 
construed as “fraud” broadly defined.  Further support for 
this assumption was provided by the drafters’ use of the 
conjunctive “or” in the 1909 amendment adding the second 
clause, which courts quickly interpreted as suggesting that 
the offense condemned by the law could be found in either 
one of the two clauses. 
Observing that the English language may be read in this 
manner does not, of course, address the ultimate question of 
meaning.  But when read closely, Section 1341 seems to 
suggest that the two offenses in question relate to fraud, on 
the one hand, and false pretenses, on the other, if both 
clauses are to be given independent meaning.  What is 
significant in this dichotomy is that fraud basically describes 
a relationship between two parties, one of whom gains and 
one of whom loses the amount in question.  In other words, 
it is a zero-sum arrangement in which the loss of one flows 
directly to the benefit of the other.   By contrast, whatever is 
meant by “obtaining money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises” is not 
confined to such a zero-sum relationship.  If you hire me to 
do a particular job, and I do that job but also leverage my 
position to gain side benefits, you have not lost nor have you 
supplied my gain.  A third party is involved in this scenario.  
This was precisely the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 
(1941).  (By way of background, the federal court system is 
comprised of three levels, with the Supreme Court at the top, 
followed by the 12 circuit courts (11 regional courts plus the 
D.C. circuit), and finally the various district courts sitting in 
each state.  The latter are the system’s trial courts.  The 
circuit courts review the district courts’ findings of law and 
issue rulings that are binding within the boundaries of their 
individual jurisdiction.  Circuit court rulings thus have no 
binding effect in other circuits, but may serve as important 
precedents for rulings by other circuit courts.  Note that this 
may create conflicts in the law, where one circuit court rules 
one way on a particular issue while another adopts a 
different rule.  One of the functions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, should it decide to accept an appeal from the circuit 
courts, is to resolve such conflicts between the circuits.)  
There, the defendant engaged in essentially the same scheme 
described in the first scenario at the beginning of this article.  
The Fifth Circuit observed that "[i]t is not true that because 
the [city] was to make and did make a saving by the 
operations there could not have been an intent to defraud” 
(id. at 119) that would rise to the level of condemnation 
under Section 1341.  Again, note the existence of the third-
party, non-zero-sum relationship exhibited in this case, 
which is distinct from the zero-sum arrangement we 
typically associate with two-party fraud.  This ruling became 
the basis for what we know today as the honest services 
doctrine. 
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But there remained a troubling issue of context in cases 
such as these: Did the statute apply only to public 
corruption, or could private employment relationships be 
subject to its coverage as well?  Note that Shushan involved 
a case of public corruption, which had been the traditional 
basis for cases brought under Section 1341.  For the most 
part, the public policy underlying prosecutions was to target 
public officials who abused their offices for private gains.  
Even though true as a matter of practice, nothing in the 
statute explicitly limited its reach to public corruption.  
Indeed, courts seem to have begun the extension of Section 
1341 to the private employment context in 1942, shortly 
after Shushan was decided (e.g., United States v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (Mass. 1942)), and by 
1982 all of the circuit courts had adopted the honest services 
doctrine and its extension to the private realm (Coffee, 1983; 
Hurson, 1983). 
What seemed to be a settled legal principle was 
unceremoniously halted in 1987, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court considered the case of a state official who chose the 
state’s insurance agent and attempted to have the agent pay a 
kickback on its commissions to outside companies partially 
owned by the official.  In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 
350, 362-364, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), following the 
approach and logic of the honest services doctrine, the state 
had not alleged that, "in the absence of the alleged scheme 
[,] the Commonwealth would have paid a lower premium or 
secured better insurance."  Instead, the prosecutor argued 
that the kickback scheme "defraud[ed] the citizens and 
government of Kentucky of their right to have the 
Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly." Id., at 353, 
107 S. Ct. 2875.  Note again the lack of a direct relationship 
that is common to traditional fraud; once more, the scheme 
involved a third party who supplied the benefit to the state 
official. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court struck down this 
aspect of the honest services doctrine.  "Rather than 
constru[ing] the statute in a manner that leaves its outer 
boundaries ambiguous…,” the Court read the statute "as 
limited in scope to the protection of property rights."  Id., at 
360, 107 S. Ct. 2875. "If Congress desires to go further, it 
must speak more clearly." Ibid.  The decision thus seemed to 
read out of existence the second clause of Section 1341, or 
to conflate its meaning with the first clause and interpret 
both jointly.  The result was that honest services 
prosecutions were no longer permissible. 
As it happened, Congress responded to McNally 
immediately, passing a new Section 1346 in 1988 to “speak 
more clearly” on the subject of honest services.  The new 
statute read: 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme 
or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice 
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services. 
 
The intent clearly was to read back into the law, in explicit 
fashion, the doctrine of honest services, but without 
additional definitional clarity.  The obvious question 
remained, strictly on the basis of the statutory language: 
What does “honest services” mean?  In circumstances such 
as these, the common approach is to incorporate the body of 
law as developed, so that in regard to the honest services 
doctrine, and in direct response to McNally, the decisions 
applying honest services to third-party arrangements in 
addition to traditional fraud and to both private and public 
relationships were reinstated. 
This brought to a close the evolutionary period of the 
honest services doctrine.  As suggested above, the principle 
traces its origin to statutes enacted a century ago, and in its 
more mature formulation to decisions and rulings that date 
from the early 1940s.  Even viewed from the perspective of 
the newer Section 1346, which for the first time explicitly 
read the phrase “honest services” into the statute books, the 
doctrine has survived for more than 20 years.  In all this, it is 
important to note that application of the doctrine is, or 
should not, be a surprise, even if the precise acts 
contemplated are not spelled out in precise detail.  There is a 
principle underlying the doctrine, which, if not delineated in 
stark language is, or should be, nonetheless apparent to those 
seeking guidance from the law.  Until Enron, that is. 
 
THE PRESENT: ENRON, SKILLING AND THE 
REDEFINITION OF HONEST SERVICES 
 
By now, Enron is somewhat old news, but by the time 
of its demise and in the months and years immediately 
thereafter it was one of the most widely publicized firms in 
American commercial history—first for its seemingly 
unparalleled success, and then for its equally unparalleled 
chicanery.  Very elaborate mechanisms had been established 
by the company involving off-balance-sheet transactions 
with various entities ultimately connected to Enron itself, if 
only one could penetrate the maze of complexity.  In fact, 
despite limited disclosure in its public filings, replete with 
obscure references but lacking factual detail, a clear picture 
of the company’s finances was impossible to obtain.  And 
yet other activities were successfully hidden completely.  
The net effect was to give the appearance of success, even 
though that success was precariously balanced on a 
mountain of debt and other obligations that could bring 
down the house of cards at a moment’s notice.  Of course, 
that is precisely what eventually transpired. 
The various Enron executives were pursued and 
prosecuted.  Ken Lay, the company’s chairman, suffered a 
heart attack while incarcerated.  Jeffrey Skilling, the CEO, 
continued to appeal his conviction, ultimately succeeding in 
coming before the Supreme Court during its 2009-10 term.  
The Court had this to say in summarizing the factual 
background of the case in its ruling issued on June 24, 2010: 
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Founded in 1985, Enron Corporation grew from its 
headquarters in Houston, Texas, into one of the 
world's leading energy companies. Skilling launched 
his career there in 1990 when Kenneth Lay, the 
company's founder, hired him to head an Enron 
subsidiary. Skilling steadily rose through the 
corporation's ranks, serving as president and chief 
operating officer, and then, beginning in February 
2001, as chief executive officer. Six months later, on 
August 14, 2001, Skilling resigned from Enron. 
 
Less than four months after Skilling's departure, 
Enron spiraled into bankruptcy. The company's stock, 
which had traded at $ 90 per share in August 2000, 
plummeted to pennies per share in late 2001. 
Attempting to comprehend what caused the 
corporation's collapse, the U.S. Department of Justice 
formed an Enron Task Force, comprising prosecutors 
and FBI agents from around the Nation.  The 
Government's investigation uncovered an elaborate 
conspiracy to prop up Enron's short-run stock prices 
by overstating the company's financial well-being. In 
the years following Enron's bankruptcy, the 
Government prosecuted dozens of Enron employees 
who participated in the scheme. In time, the 
Government worked its way up the corporation's 
chain of command: On July 7, 2004, a grand jury 
indicted Skilling, Lay, and Richard Causey, Enron's 
former chief accounting officer.  These three 
defendants, the indictment alleged, "engaged in a 
wide-ranging scheme to deceive the investing public, 
including Enron's shareholders . . . about the true 
performance of Enron's businesses by: (a) 
manipulating Enron's publicly reported financial 
results; and (b) making public statements and 
representations about Enron's financial performance 
and results that were false and misleading." Skilling 
and his co-conspirators, the indictment continued, 
"enriched themselves as a result of the scheme 
through salary, bonuses, grants of stock and stock 
options, other profits, and prestige." (Skilling v. U.S., 
130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010)). 
 
As a result, prosecutors said, Skilling had deprived the 
company and its shareholders of the intangible right of 
honest services, citing directly to Section 1346.  In addition, 
Skilling was charged with more than 25 separate offenses, 
including insider trading, securities fraud, wire fraud, and 
making false representations to auditors.   
Skilling eventually was convicted, but appealed, raising 
claims based on the lack of a fair trial and the coverage of 
Sections 1341 and 1346.  In particular, he claimed that the 
actions of which he was accused did not constitute a 
conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, and in the 
alternative that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.  
The Court upheld the fair trial rulings of the lower courts, 
and turned to the question of the honest services doctrine. 
As an initial matter, the Court declined to invalidate 
Section 1346, preferring instead to rely upon the general rule 
of law favoring construction and interpretation.  The 
question for the Court then became defining the proper 
meaning and limits of the honest services doctrine, given the 
need for constitutional consistency.  In other words, 
whatever the meaning of the statute, it had to pass 
constitutional muster.  Returning to the McNally decision 
and the subsequent adoption of Section 1346, the Court 
observed that the statute was designed to reinstate pre-
McNally jurisprudence.   
The Court could have ended its analysis at that point, 
suggesting that, whatever the limitations of the language, 
courts prior to the McNally decision did not seem to 
encounter serious issues of indeterminacy.  Nor had 
vagueness challenges been readily entertained, at least 
successfully.  In short, looking at the body of the law as it 
existed prior to McNally and the adoption of Section 1346, 
there was nothing that compelled further decision. 
But the Court continued:  
 
In parsing the Courts of Appeals decisions, we 
acknowledge that Skilling's vagueness challenge 
has force, for honest-services decisions preceding 
McNally were not models of clarity or 
consistency….While the honest-services cases 
preceding McNally dominantly and consistently 
applied the fraud statute to bribery and kickback 
schemes -- schemes that were the basis of most 
honest-services prosecutions -- there was 
considerable disarray over the statute's application 
to conduct outside that core category. (Id. at 2929.) 
  
Thus, in order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness, the 
general, or core, purpose and rule of the doctrine would be 
invoked: Since most cases decided before McNally and the 
adoption of Section 1346 involved bribery or kickback 
schemes, that must necessarily be the core meaning and 
understanding of the doctrine.  Application of the law 
beyond those kinds of situations would not be able to be 
anticipated by potential defendants, and thus would fail on 
vagueness grounds. 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia argued in favor 
of outright invalidation.  The cases and standards applied in 
previous rulings, he maintained, were hopelessly 
inconsistent and arose in a multiplicity of contextual 
circumstances that would not afford a defendant a sufficient 
opportunity to adjust his or her behavior.  Thus, as a matter 
of due process, Scalia believed that the entire statute should 
be set aside. 
It is important to note that the Court did not overturn 
Skilling’s conviction.  Rather, it sent the case back to the 
lower courts for a precise definition of the basis of his 
conviction.  Given that multiple counts and theories were 
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advanced, the record was not sufficiently clear as to the 
extent to which the conviction relied upon honest services in 
whole or in part.  If Skilling had been convicted on grounds 
other than honest services fraud, that part of the conviction 
would stand.  To the extent that his conviction was grounded 
on honest services, though, the Court’s ruling would result in 
acquittal since the case did not involve bribery or kickbacks 
under the new rule.  As of this writing, we will have some 
time to wait before the issue is resolved and Skilling’s final 
status decided.  But it is indisputable that the honest services 
doctrine is now more limited than had previously been the 
case. 
 
THE FUTURE: EVALUATING THE DECISION AND 
ITS IMPACT ON FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND 
PREVENTION 
 
As Skilling’s case shows us, other grounds for 
conviction of miscreants often are available in prosecutions 
of fraud and related offenses.  As a consequence, it is 
tempting to view the Skilling decision as nothing more than 
a technical refinement of an arcane, and possibly 
inconsequential, area of the law.  To an extent, this is a fair 
assessment, for the Court’s decision surely was correct as far 
as the narrow issue of definitional clarity is concerned.  The 
statute’s wording is ambiguous if we view the matter as one 
requiring absolute certainty of the action-reaction sequence, 
and indeed many commentators were concerned by the 
prospect of overzealous prosecutors pushing the limits of 
construction to cover more and more “offenses” (e.g., 
Parloff, 2010).  Balanced against the observation that other 
theories of legal liability may still be pursued, the prospect 
of abusive prosecution would seem to argue in favor of a 
narrow interpretation. 
But the Court’s reasoning in Skilling may still be 
criticized on two grounds, one legal and one normative.  In 
terms of the legal analysis employed by the Court, the 
approach of stripping a statute’s interpretation to its core 
principles and applications works only in cases of limited 
variance.  That is, where circumstances are such that 
absolute consistency in interpretation and practice point to a 
given result or orientation, such a step may make sense.  
(This does not resolve the issue of whether courts should 
engage in such a practice; Scalia’s concurrence and the 
majority opinion engaged in a sharp debate about this issue, 
which remains beyond the scope of this article.)  But if that 
is the case, why is there a need to specify a core 
interpretation at all?  In fact, most statutes probably do not 
fall into this category in the first instance, meaning that a 
court’s resort to core application may be more arbitrary than 
any opinions rendered under existing precedent.  This seems 
to be the case in Skilling: There were indeed a variety of 
contextual parameters and fact patterns prosecuted at various 
times under Sections 1341 and 1346.  To say that a majority 
involved bribery or kickbacks is correct, but is not a basis 
for creating a firm rule that limits future application of the 
statute.  Many cases, such as Enron, did not involve these 
particular offenses, yet exhibited obviously culpable 
behavior.  For that matter, if we are searching for some 
majority principle, why stop at the form of corruption?  Most 
cases brought under Sections 1341 and 1346 arose in the 
public sphere.  Why then did the Court not point to this 
further distinction in announcing the “core” purpose of the 
statute?  In all of these instances, the Court seems to be 
confusing context with substance in announcing a 
substantive rule of law. 
This leads to the second ground for concern: What is the 
normative impact of Skilling?  Recall once again our 
opening scenarios above, and consider the ramifications of 
the present decision for all but the first.  What impact will 
the announcement of this rule have on potential perpetrators 
of similar deeds?  Let us further suppose application of a 
similar approach to enforcement to traffic law:  If the speed 
limit stays the same (whatever it may be), but everyone 
“knows” that no one will be prosecuted for driving 5-10 
miles per hour over the speed limit, what will be the result in 
terms of behavior?  In fact, we see this on our highways 
everywhere.  Now suppose that it is announced that radar 
will no longer be used.  Other enforcement methods remain 
available for use (observation, “tailing” to estimate speed, 
etc.), but only radar will be outlawed because it is inherently 
subject to user interpretation and potential error.  Will the 
incidence of compliance with the underlying speed limits, 
even within the existing 5-10 mile per hour “grace” zone, be 
likely to increase or decrease?  In the realm of corporate 
fraud, this seems to be the end result of the logic of Skilling. 
There is also a larger normative value at stake in the 
context of corporate fraud, one that is partially disclosed by 
the hypothetical discussion above.  Most of us know what 
proper behavior is, independent of black-letter law.  
Certainly, most of us would have known that activities such 
as those that occurred at Enron were morally, ethically, and 
legally culpable.  Would the definitional certainty demanded 
by Skilling have made a difference?  On the other hand, to 
one engaged in such activities, knowing the precise 
definition could have made all the difference, but only in 
terms of knowing how to shape those activities to avoid 
coming within the ambit of the statute.  In fact, in terms of 
the ethical foundation of the law, the statute really was not 
vague prior to the Enron litigation, and its increased clarity 
now is likely only to be of service to those contemplating 
future schemes.   
In essence, the Court is imposing a rules-based 
jurisprudence that may be at odds with a more principles-
based approach.  The same approach was used in crafting the 
Sarbanes-Oxley financial reporting legislation, and was 
criticized at the time (and still is today) for being overly 
rules-driven (e.g., Rockness & Rockness, 2005).  But rules 
can always be circumvented; principles are more elastic in 
their application but arguably more representative of the 
underlying ethical foundation and behavior they are intended 
to enshrine (see e.g., Kant, 1964).  At a time when scholars 
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are recognizing the increasing need to focus on character and 
values (e.g., Wright & Goodstein, 2007), and when evidence 
of behavioral abuses in the boardroom and the executive 
suite is accumulating (e.g., Donoher et al., 2007; Dunn, 
2004; Kang, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2006), the abrogation of 
a principles-based jurisprudence is troubling.  Even if other 
enforcement mechanisms exist, the removal of one tool 
whose elasticity in fact was an advantage in terms of 
enforcement and deterrence cannot aid enforcement or the 
prevention of fraud.  The rules-oriented approach advocated 
in Skilling opens the door wider to the clever miscreant 
whose imaginative, but not clearly prohibited, malfeasance 
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